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This paper studies casino-style gambling from the public economics point of view in a 
jurisdiction populated by oligopolistically competitive legal casinos.  We consider three different 
regimes: laissez-faire, entry regulation and tax regulation.  The model highlights three important 
external effects from casino-style gambling: non-casino income creation, social disorder costs, and 
casino exporting to other jurisdictions.  In the generalized case with an endogenously-determined 
ratio of local to total gamblers, we allow the configuration of casinos to be centralized or 
jurisdiction-wide dispersed.  A complete comparison between equilibrium and command optimum 
outcomes is provided, and the welfare consequences under the three regimes and two casino 
configurations are examined.     
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1.  Introduction 
In less than a decade in the United States, commercial casino revenues increased 266%, from 
$8.7 billion in 1990 to $31.8 billion in 1999.
1    Today in the U.S., there are casinos in approximately 
200 counties in 33 states, and gambling is legalized in 48 of the 50 states (see Eadington, 1999; 
Grinols and Mustard, 2001; and Gazel, Rickman, and Thompson, 2001).  Although the growth of 
casino gambling has generated many important social, economic, and policy-related questions, “[i]t 
is surprising how little we definitely know about the social and economic impacts of this $40 billion 
a year industry.” (Eadington, 1995, in a report to Congress on the state of knowledge regarding the 
casino industry).  In the economics literature, there is a lack of comprehensive theoretical analysis 
of casino gambling, and, in particular, the relevant welfare analysis has not been formally modeled.
2  
Our paper makes a first step in this direction by developing a formal theoretical model to analyze the 
welfare effects of casino-style gambling on the community/region where gambling is permitted.     
Presently in the U.S., three types of casino markets (exclusive of Indian reservations) exist: (i) 
centralized – usually limited to one city per state, including Atlantic City in New Jersey, Detroit in 
Michigan, and Deadwood in South Dakota; (ii) dispersed – anywhere in Nevada subject to local 
zoning restrictions; and (iii) remote – usually limited to navigable rivers and designated waterways, 
as in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, and Missouri, and in designated mining towns, as in 
Colorado.    Louisiana is the only state with both centralized (New Orleans in Louisiana) and remote 
(designated waterways) casinos.  In 1998, casino revenues in these states totaled $19.9 billion, of 
which 40.5% was from dispersed casino markets (Nevada), 20.5% from centralized markets, and 
39.0% from remote markets.     
                                                 
1  It is recently reported by Garrett (2004) that the gaming revenue has been over $40 billion in 2001.     
2 To our knowledge, Sauer (2001) is the only exception, in which Becker’s (1983) model of political 
competition between interest groups is adapted to the problem of gambling regulation.       2
Casino gambling generates substantial attendant externalities including compulsive addictions, 
increased drug and alcohol abuse, and the committing of crimes.  Because it is difficult to infer 
whether such undesirable behavior may still exist in the absence of casino gambling, a precise 
estimation of its social costs is basically impossible.  Since a local government must pay to 
incarcerate and prosecute problem gamblers and provide restitution to the gamblers’ victims, some 
costs may be imputed more directly, though it needs to be recognized that they only reflect at best 
parts of the overall social cost.  Grinols and Mustard (2001) find that about 0.77% of the national 
sample could be classified as compulsive gamblers.    Goodman (1995) estimates that each problem 
gambler costs the government and the private economy $13,200 a year.
3  Similarly, Thompson, 
Gazel, and Rickman (1995) impute the associated social costs as ranging from between $12,000 and 
$50,000 per problem gambler.  These findings suggest that the social costs associated with casino 
gambling are substantial.   
Because of the associated negative externalities, casino gambling is viewed by many observers 
as a vice with limited or tainted consumer value (see Goodman, 1995).    Yet, to a local government, 
other considerations may come into play.  In addition to casino tax revenues, casinos can make 
important economic contributions to the local community, including job creation, investment 
stimulation, tourism development, and economic growth.
4  Of greater importance, jurisdictions 
with legalized casinos may become exporters of gambling services if casinos can attract a high 
proportion of their customers from outside.    A greater export effect not only creates more local net 
                                                 
3 Simply increasing the incidence of problem gambling by only one-half of one percent of the adult 
population would cost private business and the government at least $73 million per year in a small state like 
Iowa and $780 million in a large state like California.   
4 For a comprehensive discussion, the reader is referred to the special issue on legalized casinos in the 
Economic Development Review (1995).  In a recent case, the Niagara Falls Casino Inc. signed an agreement 
with the city government to guarantee, among others: (i) revenue to the city government of $2.6 million 
annually for the first 10 years, $3 million per year for the next 10 years, and $3 million per year, adjusted for 
inflation, afterward; (ii) the creation of 5,000 direct jobs in the casino complex; and, (iii) the development of 
over 30 major projects, including hotels, shopping malls, restaurant clusters, theme parks and recreation 
centers.    3
income, but also makes parts of the social disorder costs irrelevant to the local community.    In this 
case, casinos may have positive net externalities in relation to the local community (see Eadington, 
1998).  However, to generate an export effect of casinos is a difficult challenge to a local 
government, particularly if legalized casinos cater predominantly to local clientele.  In reality, Las 
Vegas is one of the very few exceptions in which most of the visitors are drawn from outside.
5     
The complexity of casino-style gambling results in a considerable variation in the patterns of 
legalized gambling operations found in different places.    For example, Thompson (1998) identifies 
some significant differences between casinos in North America and in Europe.  While the 
operations of casinos in Europe are very restrictive, the clientele of the European casino is relatively 
local.    Moreover, European casinos are subject to much higher taxes, with tax rates ranging from as 
high as 93% of gross winnings in Germany, to 80% in France, 60% in Austria, and 54% in Spain.  
By contrast, the maximum tax rates on gross winnings in American casinos range only from 6.25% 
(Nevada) to 35% (Illinois).  Furthermore, while European countries usually set limits on the 
numbers of casino establishments, only some states in the U.S. regulate the entry of casinos 
(Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana, which limit them to 3, 10, 11, and 16, respectively).  
For those states with entry regulations, the actual number of casinos is usually at or close to the 
maximum.  Partly as a result of different regulations, the numbers of casinos vary dramatically 
across states: from 230 in Nevada, to 29 in Mississippi, to 13 in New Jersey, and to 3 in Michigan.   
While the observations and comparisons mentioned above raise interesting issues that need to 
be addressed, to our knowledge there is an absence of an integrated framework to study the 
economics of casino-style gambling.  Our paper provides the first attempt to fill this gap.  
                                                 
5  For instance, Hunsaker (2001) points out that Las Vegas casinos are more of the resort-destination type with 
an average stay of 3.5 nights per tour whereas Atlantic City casinos are day-trip destinations with an average 
stay of only 6.5 hours.    While Las Vegas attracts many visitors from outside, most Atlantic City gamblers live 
within a 150-mile radius.     4
Specifically, we construct a model of casino gambling in a jurisdiction populated by 
oligopolistically competitive legal casinos and an active local government that may regulate the 
entry of casino firms or impose a casino tax surcharge.    We capture the main features of the casino 
market illustrated above.    On the one hand, we consider three important external effects associated 
with casinos: (i) non-casino income creation, (ii) social disorder costs, and (iii) casino exporting to 
other jurisdictions.    On the other hand, we highlight the importance of local versus outside visitors 
and even allow the ratio of local to total gamblers to be endogenously determined.    Furthermore, in 
the case with an endogenous ratio of local to total gamblers, we examine two different 
configurations of casinos: centralized and jurisdiction-wide dispersed.  We provide a complete 
characterization of the equilibrium and the command optima under entry or tax regulation, as well as 
a careful comparison between laissez-faire and command optimum regimes and between the two 
casino configurations. 
Our main findings are summarized as follows.  First, by comparing laissez-faire and entry 
regulation, there may be casino over-crowding or under-entry, with the former arising if the 
business-creation effect is weak, the social disorder cost is large, or the fraction of local gamblers is 
high.  Second, if the business-creation effect is weak, the social disorder cost is large, or the 
fraction of local gamblers is high, the tax-regulation command optimum features a positive tax 
surcharge with less entry compared to the laissez-faire outcome.    Third, the number of casino firms 
under a subsidy is always greater than that under entry regulation, while that under a positive tax 
surcharge could be either larger or smaller than that under the entry-regulation outcome.  Fourth, 
given the same number of casino firms, tax regulation associated with a positive tax surcharge will 
result in lower economic welfare than will entry regulation.  Finally, in response to endogenous 
adjustments in the fraction of local gamblers, the local government imposing entry regulation will 
issue a greater number of casino licenses and may achieve higher welfare if the configuration of   5
casinos is dispersed. 
  
2.  The  Model 
Consider a local economy, which may be regarded as a state of the U.S. or a casino community.   
There are three theaters of economic activities in the local economy: a continuum of consumers of 
unit mass, a continuum of casino firms of mass  0 > n , and a local (jurisdiction) benevolent 
government.
6  Implicitly, there are local non-casino firms and non-local casino consumers, which 
are exogenous in the benchmark model.  In this case, consumers are entirely passive, with fixed 
local consumption in terms of casino gambling which provides a utility of a simple linear form.  
Each casino firm faces a given demand schedule that exhibits constant elasticity, producing “casino 
services”  y under a simple constant-marginal-cost technology.
7  In the absence of government 
regulation of entry, a casino firm decides whether to operate given a fixed entry cost and unrestricted 
entry implies that zero profit must be achieved in equilibrium.     
With respect to local government regulations, the imposition of a casino tax has been a 
common practice in America with maximum tax rates on gross gambling revenues ranging from 
6.25% (Nevada) to 35% (Illinois).  Of those states that permit casino-style gambling, only four 
(Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana) have entry regulations.  Moreover, limits on wager 
and/or loss have been rare – in terms of casino revenues in 1998, only 2.6% featured wager limits 
(Colorado and South Dakota, with a $5 maximum) and 4.3% with loss limits (Missouri, with a cap 
of $500 per excursion).    Thus, we may ignore wager and loss limits without loss of generality, and 
instead focus on entry regulation and casino tax policy.     
Accordingly, we consider three different regimes of interest:     
                                                 
6  The continuum setup enables us to avoid unnecessary complications resulting from integer programming. 
7 In regard to the issues studied in this paper, it is sufficient to consider the behavior of an average 
representative casino firm without loss of generality.   6
(i)  Regime I: (laissez-faire)  The local government allows firms to freely enter into the 
casino industry under which firms choose the scale of casino services with the number 
of firms determined by the zero-profit condition.   
(ii)  Regime II: (entry regulation)    The local government regulates casino activity by setting 
the number of licenses n under which firms decide whether to enter according to the 
participation constraint.     
(iii)  Regime III: (tax regulation)  The local government regulates casino activity by setting 
a tax surcharge  σ  (negative if it is a subsidy) under which firms choose to enter until 
the zero-profit condition is met.   
2.1. The Casino Market 
Since the behavior of consumers is entirely passive in the benchmark case, our main focus will 
be on the activity of casino firms.  By denoting the total output of casino services in the local 
market by Y (i.e.,  ny Y = ), we assume that the inverse demand function takes the constant-elasticity 
form: 
ε / 1 ) (








ε .  
Upon paying a fixed setup cost  0 C , each firm can produce casino services y with a variable cost 
cy y C = ) (   where the marginal cost  0 > c  is  a  constant.   
Under a flat business tax rate t and a casino tax surcharge σ , a representative firm in the 
casino market solves the following profit maximization problem to determine its casino service 
scale:   
y
max   0 ) ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ( C cy y Y P t y − − + − = σ π .       ( 1 )  
In the case where entry is regulated (ex post) by the local government, the following 
participation constraint must be met:  cy y Y P t > + − ) ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ σ , that is, the after-tax casino revenues 
must exceed the variable operating cost.    Equivalently, the participation constraint can be expressed   7
conveniently as:   
0 ) ( C y − ≥ π .          ( 2 )  
Without entry regulation, firms continue to enter the casino market as long as  0 ) ( ≥ y π . 
 
2.2. Local Community Welfare 
Given a mass of n casino firms, the aggregate producer surplus is measured by: 
} ] ) 1 ( 1 {[ ) ( 0 C cy Py t n y n − − + − = σ π .  In the benchmark case, the ratio of local to total casino 
gamblers, denoted by β , is exogenously given.  Under a utilitarian social welfare setup, the 
aggregate utility stemming from casino services in the local economy is given by  ) ( Y U β , where 
0 > ′ U ,  0 < ′ ′ U  and  0 ) 0 ( = U . Thus, the aggregate consumer surplus of local clienteles is 
measured by:  ( ) UY P Y β β − .   
As mentioned in the Introduction, the indirect spin-offs that occur as a by-product of casinos 
make important economic contributions to a local economy.  These spin-offs include job creation, 
investment stimulation, tourism development, and other types of economic growth forces.
8  T o  
capture such additional income generated by casinos, we assume that a multiple  0 > η  of casino 
output Y can be generated, thereby yielding a net income of  Y t) 1 ( − η .   
It is also important that we take into account attendant externalities generated by casino 
gambling, including compulsive addictions, increased drug and alcohol abuse, and an array of 
larcenies and violent crimes.  As already discussed in the Introduction, these social disorder costs 
can be enormous.  To a local economy, such disorder costs are more significant with dispersed 
statewide casinos than they are with destination resort casinos (cf. Eadington, 1995a).  In reality, 
however, there are very few entertainment based destination resort casinos, such as some in Las 
Vegas.  In the case of most casinos, visitors are drawn from local rather than other regions.  In 
                                                 
8  Eadington (1995a, 1995b) claims that the effect of casinos on other businesses is an important consideration 
in the legalization of casinos.             8
order to account for this, we allow the disorder costs D to depend on the ratio of local to total 
gamblers,
9 i.e.,  Y d D β = , with  0 > d  capturing the extent to which such social costs are 
generated.  This implies that the social disorder costs of casinos are greater if casinos draw more 
local visitors (i.e.,  β  is  larger).  
In practice, government tax revenues may be used for consumption, investment and transfer 
purposes.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the entirety of government tax revenues R 
will be redistributed to the local residents on a lump-sum basis.  Under flat business taxes and 
casino tax surcharges, we have:  tPY Y t R ) 1 ( σ η + + = .    Accordingly, the local community welfare 
function W can be specified as: 
R D Y t PY Y U C cy Py t n n W + − − + − + − − + − = ) 1 ( ] ) ( [ } ] ) 1 ( 1 {[ ) ; ( 0 η β β σ σ , 
or, upon substituting in the expressions of Y, D, and R: 
ny d ny P cy C n ny U n W β β η β σ − − + + + − = ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) ( ) ; ( 0 .      (3) 
In equation (3), the terms  ny P] ) 1 ( [ β η − +  and  ny dβ , respectively, correspond to the positive and 
negative externalities stemming from casino gambling in the local economy.  They will play 
prominent roles in our analysis.     
  In Regime I, the only use of the local community welfare function is to evaluate the social 
welfare in the local economy.    In Regime II, the local government’s welfare maximization problem 
is given by:   
n
max  W ) ; ( σ n , whereas in Regime III it can be specified as: 
σ
max  W ) ; ( σ n .  
 
3.    Optimization, Equilibrium and Command Optimum 
  In this section, we begin by solving the representative casino firm’s profit maximization 
problem.  We then define and establish the free-entry equilibrium, the command optimum under 
                                                 
9  Our results remain qualitatively unchanged under a general setup:  Y d d D ) ( 0 β + = , with  0 0 > d .   9
the entry regulation regime and the command optimum under the tax regulation regime.
10 
 
3.1. The Casino Firm’s Optimization 
  Under the Cournot-Nash structure, the corresponding first-order necessary condition associated 
with the firm’s profit maximization problem (1) is: 
0 )
1
1 ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ = − − + − = c
n
P t y ε
σ π ,       ( 4 )  
which is sufficient when the following second-order condition is satisfied: 
0 ' )
1
1 ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ < − + − = P
n
n t yy ε
σ π .  The second-order condition requires that  1 > n ε , which 
ensures an interior solution.    Given that, we obtain:   
) , ; ( σ t n y y = ,         ( 5 )  
where  0 / )] / 2 1 )( / 1 ][( ) 1 ( 1 [ <
> − + − = yy n n t P y π ε ε σ ,  0 / ) / 1 1 )( 1 ( < − + = yy t n P y π ε σ , and 
0 / ) / 1 1 ( < − = yy n Pt y π ε σ .            
  Equation (5) conveys Seade’s (1980) argument that the number of firms has an ambiguous 
effect on the equilibrium output per firm.  However, the equilibrium output per firm falls as the 
number of firms increases, provided that  ) (Y P  is concave, or convex with a sufficiently low 
curvature.  In this case, we obtain a result resembling the business-stealing effect (as defined in 
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) – a new entrant leads the incumbent firms to have a lower volume of 
sales by stealing their business.    In the following analysis, to simplify our analysis, we focus on the 
situation where the so-called business-stealing effect exists, i.e.,  0 < n y .  This requires that 
2 > n ε , under which the second-order condition is automatically satisfied.  Equation (5) also 
indicates that imposing a higher tax (either t or  σ ) increases each firm’s cost and hence decreases 
                                                 
10 We refer to the “command optimum” as a social optimum, based exclusively on the community’s welfare, 
and constrained to a particular set of policy instruments (entry and casino tax) without direct control over the 
scale of casino services.   10
its casino services. 
 
3.2. The Laissez-Faire Regime 
A free-entry equilibrium is a pair of casino services and a mass of firms (y, n), such that each 
casino firm maximizes its profit subject to a given service production technology and a given cost 
schedule under which the zero-profit condition is satisfied.    Under unrestricted entry, the number of 
firms in the casino market, 
E n , is therefore determined by the zero-profit condition given by, 
0 ) ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 0 = − − + − = C cy y Y P t y σ π .       ( 6 )  
A free-entry equilibrium is called nondegenerate if  0 >
E n . 
  For analytical tractability, we assume that the price elasticity of casino demand is unity, i.e., 
1 = ε .  Under this assumption, aggregate casino revenues become constant ( 1 = PY ), which 
greatly simplifies the analysis.
11  Given this, we can use (4) to derive the representative firm’s 
casino service scale and the price of casino services as follows:   
2




σ + − −
= ,       ( 7 )  
] ) 1 ( 1 )[ 1 ( t n
cn
P
σ + − −
= .       ( 8 )  
Substituting (7) and (8) into the zero-profit condition (6) yields the laissez-faire number of casinos: 
0




E σ + −
= .         ( 9 )  
This implies that both taxes and fixed entry costs lower casino firms’ profitability and hence reduce 





















,        ( 1 0 )  
which is increasing in terms of the fixed cost and decreasing in terms of the marginal cost and the 
                                                 
11  It should be noted that, with a general constant elasticity, our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged.   11
two tax rates. 
  Consider the following assumption that ensures the presence of the business-stealing effect 
(i.e., n > 2) and also the validity of the second-order condition, 
Assumption 1:   
4






We then establish: 
Theorem 1: (Existence of a Nondegenerate Free-Entry Equilibrium)  Under Assumption 1 with 
1 = ε , there exists a unique nondegenerate free-entry equilibrium (y, n
E) satisfying (9) and (10). 
 
3.3. Command Optimum in the Entry Regulation Regime 
An entry-regulation command optimum is a pair of casino services and a mass of firms (y, n) 
such that each casino firm chooses y to maximize its profit subject to a given service production 
technology and a given cost schedule, while the local government determines the entry n to 
maximize the local community welfare W specified in (3).
12   
Define the tax revenue per casino as  tPy CT ) 1 ( σ + =   and the net marginal external benefit as 
ε β β η / ) 1 ( P d NMEB − − − = .  An interior optimal number of issued licenses in this regime, 
denoted by 
Q n , must satisfy the following first-order condition:   
, 0 ) ( ) (
) / 1 1 ( ) 1 ( 0
= + ⋅ + − + =
− − + − + − − ′ =
∂
∂
CT NMEB A ny c P y




ε β β η β
     ( 1 1 )  
where  n ny y n ny A + = ∂ ∂ ≡ / ) (   is assumed to be positive, as in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).    In 
deriving equation (11), the consumer’s equilibrium condition  P U = ′  is  used.   
  We must also check the participation constraint, (2), facing each casino firm.    Manipulating (4) 
                                                 
12 More precisely, we suppose hypothetically that the community not only just restricts entry but can also 
induce entry.  This is assumed because, a priori, we want to allow for the possibility of under-entry in 
decentralized laissez-faire equilibrium.     12
gives:  , ] ) 1 ( 1 [ 0 0 n
Py
t C y y ε





σ .  That is, at the 
casino firm’s optimal service scale, the participation constraint under the entry regulation regime 
never binds. 
In the absence of casino externalities and taxes, i.e.,  0 = = CT NMEB , our condition reduces 
to the optimum entry condition in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).    In this case, the first term  ) (y π  
on the right-hand side of (11) reflects the fact that a new entrant contributes to community welfare 
through the profit it generates, whereas the second term  n ny c P ) ( −   measures how the new entrant 
crowds out the incumbents by lowering their services provided to the local casino industry.   In the 
presence of the business-stealing effect, the second term is negative and hence an interior number of 
casinos is determined as long as  0 ) ( > y π .  In the case where  0 ) ( 0 ≤ ≤ − y C π , the optimal 
regulation policy is to prohibit the establishment of casinos in the local economy, i.e.,  0 =
Q n . 
In general, due to the distinctive features of casinos, there are two additional welfare effects 
associated with changes in the number of casino firms n: the casino externality effect (via NMEB) 
and the casino tax effect (via CT).  These two effects not only contribute to the study by Mankiw 
and Whinston (1986) on firm entry, but also provide additional insights toward evaluating the 
welfare consequences of legalizing casinos.  A formal analysis of these effects is relegated to 
Section 4 below. 
  Again, we assume, for analytical tractability, that  1 = ε , under which each casino firm’s 
service scale is given by (7) with the price of casino services given by (8),  0









n A An / 2 − = .    Utilizing (11), we can derive the second-order condition for the command optimum 
under entry regulation:  , 0 ) ( ) ( /
2 2 2 < + − − + ′ + ′ ′ = ≡ ∂ ∂ n n nn cy A c d U U A W n W β η β β  which  is 
guaranteed by Assumption 1 together with the following (sufficient) condition, 
Assumption 2:   . 0 > − − c dβ η      13
  Substituting (7), (8) and the expression for A into (11), we must have 
Q n  satisfy: 
0 ] ) 1 ( 1 )[ (
1







− ≡ Γ t c d
n
n C cn n σ β η
β
,    (12) 
which is monotonically increasing in n.    Notice that under  1 = ε , the presence of business-stealing 
effects requires that  2 > n .  
  Consider the following assumption,   
Assumption 3:   ]. ) 1 ( 1 )[ ( 2 4 0 t c d c cC σ β η β + − − − + <  




.  Thus, by means of the intermediate-value 
theorem, we can establish: 
Theorem 2: (Existence of an Entry-Regulation Command Optimum)    Under Assumptions 1-3 with 
1 = ε , a unique nondegenerate entry-regulation command optimum exists in which (y,
Q n ) satisfies 
(7) and (12). 
 Furthermore,  we  consider, 
Assumption 4:   . 2 ] ) 1 ( 1 [ c t d > + − σ  





, must exceed the 
price of casino services, i.e.,  P d > .  We now differentiate (11) with respect to  η β, , and d to 
establish: 
Lemma 1: (Casino Externality Effects in the Entry Regulation Regime)  Under Assumptions 1-3 
with  1 = ε , the effects of casino externalities on the optimal number of firms 
Q n  are given by: 
0















) 1 /( 2















 and  0
) 1 /( 2















σ β .  
If we further impose Assumption 4, then  0 / < ∂ ∂ β
Q n . 
While the results concerning the positive external effect of casinos from income creation (η ) and 
the negative effect from social disorder (d) are intuitive, those to do with the ratio of local to total   14
visitors deserve further comment.    Specifically, an increase in  β   raises the consumer’s surplus of 
local visitors, but also induces social disorders stemming from gambling.  Therefore, a higher  β , 
in general, has an ambiguous effect on the optimal number of licenses issued by the local 
government.  However, as established by many empirical studies, including Goodman (1995) and 
Thompson, Gazel, and Rickman (1995), the consumer surplus of the casinos is usually tainted and 
viewed as inessential compared with the associated social costs.  Thus, in what follows, we will 
impose Assumption 4 and hence  0 / < ∂ ∂ β
Q n .      
 
3.4. Command Optimum in the Tax Regulation Regime 
A tax-regulation command optimum is a pair of casino services and a mass of firms (y, n) 
such that (i) each casino firm chooses y to maximize its profit subject to a given service production 
technology and a given cost schedule; (ii) the entry of casino firms n is pinned down by the 
zero-profit condition, and, (iii) the local government determines the casino tax surcharge σ  to 
maximize the local community welfare W specified in (3).  Under this regime, the number of 
casino firms is denoted by 
T n , whereas the casino tax surcharge satisfies the following first-order 
condition:  
0 ] ) [( 0 =
∂
∂





C B NMEB c P
W
,        ( 1 3 )  
with  σ ∂ ∂ ≡ / ) (ny B .  It is possible for the optimal σ  to be negative (i.e., a subsidy to casino 
firms), though the government budget balance requires that  . 1 − ≥ σ    
By imposing  1 = ε   and recalling that the presence of the business-stealing effect requires that 
2 > n , we can use (7) and (8) to derive  0
2
) 1 ( 1












 and rewrite the 




















, 1 , ) 1 (
1
max min ) (
2








) ( σ , the tax surcharge imposed by the local government is sufficiently large to 
eliminate any profitability in which case no firm would enter the casino market.    Substituting these 
expressions into (13) implies that the optimal number of firms 
T n  satisfies  the  following  necessary 
condition:  
0 ] )) ( 1 ( 1 )[ (
1 1 2









≡ Λ t n c d
n n
n C
cn n σ β η
β
.      ( 1 5 )  
where  0
) 1 )( 1 2 (
) 1 2 2 (
) 1 2 (
) 1 ( 2



















   We 
impose, 
Assumption 5:   ] ) 1 ( 1 )[ ( 2
3
4 0 t c d c
cC
σ β η β + − − − + < . 
This guarantees  0 ) 2 ( < Λ .   
The second-order condition for an optimal tax surcharge σ  requires: 
. 0
) 1 ( 2
) 1 2 (
] ) 1 ( 1 )[ (















c t c d
n t
tn β
β σ β η
σ
σ   Recall that  1 − ≥ σ ; 
thus a sufficient condition for the second-order condition to be met is, 
Assumption 6:   . ) ( η β > + + c d c  
We can then establish: 
Theorem 3: (Existence of a Tax-Regulation Command Optimum)    Under Assumptions 1, 2, 5 and 
6 with  1 = ε , a unique nondegenerate tax-regulation command optimum exists in which (y, n
T,σ ) 
satisfies (7), (14) and (15). 
We are ready to compare the outcomes under the three different regimes to which we now turn. 
  
3.5. An Alternative to Direct Entry Regulation 
Up to now, the entry-regulation command optimum has been modeled as direct entry control.  
One may inquire what happens if it is undertaken via a license fee.  Specifically, we express the   16
license fee as a proportion of the setup fixed cost,  0 fC , where  0 > f .  We can then define an 
entry fee-regulation command optimum as a triple (y, n, f) such that (i) each casino firm chooses y 
to maximize its profit subject to a given service production technology and a given cost schedule; (ii) 
the entry of casino firms n is pinned down by the zero-profit condition, and (iii) the local 
government determines the license fee f to maximize the local community welfare W.  Under this 
regime, the number of casino firms is denoted by 
F n .   
Given the license fee f, the profit maximization problem can be rewritten as: 
    
y
max   ) 1 ( ) ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 0 f C cy y Y P t y + − − + − = σ π .     
Since  f  does not enter the corresponding first-order condition, the representative firm’s casino 
service scale and the price of casino services remain the same as in (7) and (8) (under  1 = ε ).  The 
zero-profit condition is now modified to,   
       0 ) 1 ( ) ( ] ) 1 ( 1 [ ) ( 0 = + − − + − = f C cy y Y P t y σ π ,     
which together with (7) and (8) yields the number of casinos: 
) 1 (
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Next, we need to modify the government budget constraint to take the license fee revenue into 
account:  n fC tPY Y t R 0 ) 1 ( + + + = σ η .  However, since the entirety of government revenues R is 
redistributed to the local residents on a lump-sum basis, the community welfare remains unchanged 
as in (3).    The first-order condition for the command optimum license fee schedule is:   
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  and re-arranging, one then obtains: 
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which is exactly the same as the optimal condition in the case of entry regulation (12).     
To sum up, either by setting up a license fee or by directly controlling the number of licenses 
for casino firms, the command optimum outcomes are identical.  In practice, however, direct 
control by setting a quota is more common than charging a fixed license fee.   
 
4.  Comparisons  between  Various  Regimes 
  The main purpose in comparing the entry-regulation command optimum with the free-entry 
equilibrium is to understand whether or not the local economy is over-loaded with casinos under 
laissez-faire.    By contrasting the tax-regulation command optimum with the free-entry equilibrium, 
we can learn whether a casino tax surcharge or subsidy is needed in order to correct the externality 
problems associated with casinos.  Finally, we can compare the entry-regulation command 
optimum with the tax-regulation command optimum to see whether quantity control or price control 
is the more effective regulatory policy in the legalization process of the casino market. 
 
4.1. Laissez-Faire versus Entry Regulation 
In the laissez-faire regime, the free-entry equilibrium number of casinos, 
E n , is pinned down 
by the zero-profit (ZP) locus (9), while under entry regulation, the optimal number of casino firms 
Q n   satisfies the entry-regulation (ER) locus (12).    We depict these loci in Figure 1 to illustrate that 
the outcomes depend crucially on the degree to which gamblers are locally-based (β ).     18
Since individual firms ignore the external effects, the entry decision is independent of  β , 
implying a horizontal ZP locus.  The vertical intercept of the ER locus is 
c C c t n 0 / ) ]( ) 1 ( 1 [ − + − = η σ .  Under Assumption 4,  P d >  and it follows from (12) that ER is 
downward sloping.  In general, n  (the vertical intercept of the ER) could be greater or less than 
0 / ] ) 1 ( 1 [ C t n
E σ + − = .  When  0 2 ≤ − c η , 
E n n ≤  and hence the casinos must over-crowd the 
local economy under laissez-faire, i.e.,  ,
Q E n n >  for any  0 > β .  This resembles the conclusion 
obtained by Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
13  Intuitively, since  0 2 ≤ − c η , the business-creation 
effect is not too strong; the presence of the business-stealing effect (Assumption 1) is therefore 
sufficient to ensure casino over-crowding in the absence of government regulation. 
We next turn to the case of  0 2 > − c η , i.e., the positive externality of the casinos through 
business creation is substantial.  In this case, 
E n n >  and thus it is possible to have  ,
Q E n n <  
particularly if the business-creation effect is strong (η  is large), the social disorder cost is nil (d is 
small), or the fraction of local gamblers is small (β  is small), because under these circumstances 
the net marginal external benefit (NMEB) is large.
14    This result contrasts with the 
Mankiw-Whinston proposition – even when the business-stealing effect is present, entry need not be 
more desirable to the entrant than it is to the society.   
Summarizing, 
 
                                                 
13 In our terminology, the Mankiw-Whinston framework ignores the external effects ( 0 = = d η  and  1 = β ) 
and taxes ( 0 = t ), under which (9) and (12) reduce to  0 / 1 C n
E =  and  ] ) 1 ( /[ 1 0 − =
Q Q n C n , respectively.  
So, the result  ≥
E n
Q n   always holds as long as the business-stealing effect is present (so that  2 > n ).   
14 Equation (12) implies that, given  β , as  η  increases (d increases), ER shifts rightwards (leftwards) to 
) ( ↑ η ER  ( ) ( ↑ d ER ).     19
Proposition 1: (Laissez-Faire versus Entry Regulation)    Under Assumptions 1-3, with  1 = ε ,  
(i)  casinos always over-crowd the local economy in laissez-faire if  0 2 ≤ − c η ; 
(ii)  given  0 2 > − c η , there may be under-entry of casinos in laissez-faire if the 
business-creation effect is strong, the social disorder cost is nil, or the fraction of local 
gamblers is small. 
 
4.2. Laissez-Faire versus Tax Regulation 
  Recall that the zero-profit (ZP) locus (9) determines the free-entry equilibrium number of 
casinos 
E n .    Under tax regulation, the optimal tax surcharge 
T σ   and the number of casinos 
T n  
are pinned down by the tax-regulation (TR) locus (15) and the zero-profit locus (14).  It is easily 
seen from these two expressions that both loci must be downward sloping.  Under Assumption 6, 
the second-order condition is met under which the ZP locus is steeper than the TR  locus.   
From Figure 2, we learn that, based on Assumption 4, a casino tax surcharge must be imposed 
(i.e.,  0 > σ ) if the business-creation effect is weak (η  is small), the social disorder cost is 
enormous (d is large), or the fraction of local gamblers is large (β   is large); otherwise, a subsidy is 
needed to achieve the tax-regulation command optimum.  Accordingly, with a positive tax 
surcharge (a subsidy on casino services), the command optimum must feature less (more) entry 
compared to the zero-tax free-entry equilibrium.    These results can be summarized in the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: (Laissez-Faire versus Tax Regulation)    Consider Assumptions 1, 2, and 4-6 and set 
1 = ε .  If the business-creation effect is weak, the social disorder cost is large, or the fraction of 
local gamblers is large, then the tax-regulation command optimum is associated with a positive tax 
surcharge and less entry compared to the zero-tax free-entry equilibrium; otherwise, it is associated 
with a subsidy on casino services and more entry.   20
  
4.3. Entry versus Tax Regulation   
Recall that, under tax regulation, the optimal tax surcharge and the number of casinos are 
pinned down by the tax-regulation (TR) locus (15) and the zero-profit (ZP) locus (14), while under 
entry regulation, the optimal number of casino firms satisfies the entry-regulation (ER) locus (12).  
By examining (12), it is clear that the ER locus is downward sloping in  ) , ( σ n  space.  Moreover, 
we learn from (12) and (15) that  0
1 2
) 1 ( 2





= Λ − Γ
n
n n cC
n n .  Since both  ) (n Γ  and  ) (n Λ  
are increasing in n, given the same  σ , the level of n under the tax regulation regime should be 
higher than under the entry regulation regime.  Thus, in Figures 3a and 3b the TR locus is 
uniformly above the ER locus.  
Given 0 = σ   under the entry regulation regime, Figure 3a provides a graphical illustration for 
the case associated with a casino subsidy.  Proposition 2 has pointed out that if the 
business-creation effect is strong (η  is large), the social disorder cost is nil (d is small), or the 
fraction of local gamblers is small (β  is small), casino services are subsidized (i.e.,  0 < σ ).  In 
this scenario, the number of casino firms under tax regulation must be greater than under entry 
regulation, i.e., 
T Q n n < . 
We next turn to the case where there is a positive tax surcharge and illustrate it in Figure 3b.  
Specifically, we can derive the following relationship from (12) and (15): 
0
1 2
) 1 ( 2





− − − + = Γ = Λ
n
n n cC
t c d n n σ β η σ σ . 
Accordingly, we can find a critical level  σ ˆ  such  that  0 ) 0 , ( ) ˆ , ( = = Γ − Λ σ σ n n , or, 
) ( ] 1 ) ˆ ( 2 [











σ .        ( 1 6 )  
where  ) ˆ (σ n  is given by (14).  Thus,  ) ˆ ( ˆ σ n n n n
T Q = = =  and from (16), the critical value σ ˆ  
must be positive to achieve  n n n
T Q ˆ = = .  That is, in order for the entry-regulation and   21
tax-regulation outcomes to coincide, a casino tax surcharge must be imposed.  In other words, if 
casino firms are subject to a positive tax surcharge, then the number of casino firms under tax 
regulation could be either greater or smaller than that under entry regulation.   
It is also interesting to compare the levels of welfare between the entry-regulation and 
tax-regulation regimes provided that the number of casinos is the same  n n n
T Q ˆ = = .  Let us 
denote 
T W   as the welfare in the tax-regulation command optimum and 
Q W   as the welfare in the 
entry-regulation command optimum.    Given  n n n
T Q ˆ = = , we can utilize the welfare specification 
(3) to derive: 
) ( ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) 0 ; ˆ ( ) ˆ ; ˆ (
Q T Q T Q T y y n c d y n U y n U n W n W − − − + − = = − β η β β σ σ . 
Based on Assumption 2 and on U being monotone, it follows immediately that  >
T W
Q W  as  long 
as 
Q T y y > .   
Given 0 = σ , from (4) we have:  2 ˆ





= .  Furthermore, it follows from (7) and 




T ) 1 ˆ ( 0 −
= .  Thus, it is easily seen from Figure 3b that, under 
n n n
T Q ˆ = = , the necessary and sufficient condition for the welfare under entry regulation to be 
higher than under tax regulation is  0 / ) 1 ( ˆ C t n − < , where the right-hand side is n(0) solved from 
(14) (i.e., the vertical intercept of the ZP locus).  This inequality holds only if casinos face a 
positive tax surcharge (i.e.,  0 > σ ).  In the context of international trade, a general conclusion is 
that a quantity control (quota) is inferior to a price control (tariff).
15  In the context of casino 
gambling, however, we can establish that a quantity control (entry regulation) leads to higher 
welfare than a price control (tax regulation) when casinos are taxed with a positive surcharge in the 
tax-regulation command optimum (which holds if the business-creation effect is weak, the social 
disorder cost is enormous, or the fraction of local gamblers is large). 
                                                 
15  See, for example, a comprehensive discussion in Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983, chapter 10).   22
We summarize these results as follows: 
 
Proposition 3: (Entry Regulation versus Tax Regulation)  Under Assumptions 1-3, 5 and 6 with 
1 = ε , if casino firms are subsidized in a tax-regulation command optimum, the number of casino 
firms under tax regulation is always greater than under entry regulation ( i.e., 
T Q n n < ); if casino 
firms are subject to a positive tax surcharge, then:     
(i)  the number of casino firms under tax regulation could be either larger or smaller than 
under entry regulation;   
(ii)  given the same number of casino firms (i.e.,  n n n
T Q ˆ = = ), the associated economic 
welfare under tax regulation is always lower. 
 
5.    Endogenous Ratio of Local to Total Casino Gamblers   
We have assumed the fraction of local to total gamblers (β ) to be exogenous.  We now 
consider the behavior of consumers engaged in casino gambling to allow for an endogenous 
determination of β .  Specifically, we modify the previously-assumed identical preferences of 
potential consumers to differentiate their demand for casino services depending on their residential 
location z, which is uniformly distributed with a well-defined p.d.f.,  ) (z g , over a compact support, 
[0,1].   
There is a growing interest in the discussion on the geographical structure of legal casinos.  
To discuss this issue, this section extends the model above and considers two types of casino market: 
centralized and dispersed statewide casinos.  The remote-type casinos can be thought of as an 
intermediate case of centralized and dispersed statewide casinos.  In the case with centralized 
casinos, we assume that the legal casinos are restrictively located at  0 = z   (see Figure 4a), while in 
the case with dispersed statewide casinos the legal casinos are located between 0 and the state border,   23
z  (see  Figure  4b).   
We assume for simplicity that casino visitors incur a transportation cost that is linear in terms 
of the distance from their residential locations to the casino sites.    An individual follows a two-step 
decision process: he first decides whether or not to visit the casinos and afterward chooses the level 
of demand for the casinos, denoted by x.    The utility derived by consuming x is specified by  ) (⋅ u , 
with 0 > ′ u  and  0 < ′ ′ u .  By backward induction, we first solve the individual’s demand for 
casino-style gambling  ) (P x
∗ , where  0 <
∗
P x   satisfies the standard Law of Demand.     
 
5.1. Centralized Casinos   
Under the centralized configuration with all casinos located at  0 = z , the indirect utility 
function of the individual is given by: 
u() (P x
∗ ) z δ − ,         ( 1 7 )  
where  0 > δ  and  z δ   measures the disutility stemming from commuting to the casino sites.    The 
active participation constraint for an individual who visits casinos is  u() (P x
∗ )0 ≥ − z δ .  Thus, 
we denote 
C z   as the critical value of z at which  u() (P x
∗ )0 = −
C z δ  and  solve:   
δ




= ,          ( 1 8 )  
which is decreasing in P.                    
Given that z is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the market demand for casinos is 





∗ ∗ − + = x z z x z
C ) ( , where 
∗ x z  and 
∗ − x z z
C ) (  are the local and 
non-local demands, respectively.  Accordingly, the endogenous ratio of local to total casino 
gamblers under a centralized casino configuration is: 
) (






















β  and hence 
C C z z / 1 ) 1 ( − = − β .  To be meaningful, we assume that   24
the export effect of casinos exists, i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( > −
C β , which implies that 
C z z ≤ .  Under this 
assumption, Figure 5a illustrates the relationship between 
C z  and 
C β .       
  We next turn to the optimization problem facing the casino firms.  In facing the market 
demand given by  Ψ , a casino firm chooses y so as to maximize the π  reported in (1).  The 
corresponding first-order condition is   
0 )
1




σ π ,       ( 2 0 )  
where ) / )( / ( Ψ ∂ Ψ ∂ − =
∗ P P ε  is the price elasticity for casinos with an endogenous β .  In 
equilibrium, the market demand,  ) (
∗ = Ψ x z
C , must equal the supply,  ny Y = .   
  Given that the local government is only concerned with the local consumer surplus and that the 
demand on the part of the local visitors is  Y x z
C β =
∗ , the local consumer surplus in equilibrium 
can be expressed as  z PY P x u z
C δ β − −
∗ )) ( ( .  Under linear utility,  ) (
∗ x u z ) ( ) ( Y U x z U
C β = =
∗ .  
Accordingly, the welfare achieved by the local economy is modified as: 
z ny d Pny ny C cy n ny U W
C C C δ β β η β − − − + + + − = ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 0 ,    (21) 
where 
C β  and  y solve (19) and (20). 
With an endogenous 
C β , the socially optimal number of firms under the entry-regulation 
regime, denoted by 
C n , satisfies: 
0 ) ( ) ( = ′ − + ⋅ + − + =
∂
∂
A P dY CT NMEB A ny c P y
n
W C
P n β π ,    (22) 
which differs from (11) by only an additional term,  A P dY
C
P ′ − β .  We can therefore conclude that 
as 0 > ′ − A P dY
C
P β , we must have 
Q C n n >   if everything else remains the same.    Summarizing,   
 
Proposition 4: (Endogenous  β  and Entry Regulation)  Under Assumptions 1 and 2 with an 
endogenous fraction of local casino gamblers, the entry-regulation command optimum features a 
greater number of casino firms than with an exogenously fixed fraction of local casino gamblers.     25
Equation (19) indicates that, if the export effect of the casinos is endogenously determined, 
increasing the number of casino firms will reduce the price in the casino market and, accordingly, 
invigorate the demand for casino services and hence lower the ratio of local gamblers  β .  A  lower 
β   (or a higher  β − 1 ) implies that casinos give rise to a greater export effect.    As a consequence 
of this “export-based” benefit, the entry-regulation command optimum features a larger number of 
casinos when the local government takes the endogenous ratio of local gamblers into account.   
This result reflects Gazel’s (1998) argument that “with a few exceptions, many state and local 
economies in the United States have, most likely, experienced net losses due to casino gambling in 
their jurisdictions … [o]ne of the major reasons for such negative impacts is the strategy of the 
monopolistic and oligopolistic market structure chosen by the new jurisdictions, … [which] resulted 
in low ratios of non-local to total visitors,” or, in our language, a high  β .  This also has an 
important implication for assessing the consequences of casino market structures, particularly for 
those with imperfect market structures or which impose restrictions on the operations of casinos.     
 
5.2. Dispersed Jurisdiction-wide Casinos   
If the legal casinos are dispersed within a jurisdiction (state), the casinos are scattered between 
0 and  z   (as illustrated by Figure 4b).    Analogous to Section 5.1, the active participation constraint 
facing each individual is given by:   
u() (P x
∗ ) 0 ) ( ≥ − − z z δ .        ( 2 3 )  
where the only difference between (17) and (23) is the disutility term.   
By repeating the same procedure, we can solve for the critical value 
D z  that satisfies 
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Figure 5b illustrates the relationship between 
D z  and 
D β  in equilibrium.  By comparing (24) 
with (19), it can be established that 
C D β β < : 
  
Proposition 5: (Centralized versus Dispersed Statewide Casinos)    Under Assumptions 1 and 2 with 
an endogenous fraction of local casino gamblers, the entry-regulation command optimum in the 
dispersed configuration generates a greater export-based benefit and higher welfare than in the 
centralized configuration. 
  
This result suggests that legal casinos that are dispersed may be a better institutional design for the 
local community, which also provides a plausible explanation for the success of the Nevada casino 
industry.   
 
6.  Concluding  Remarks 
We have constructed an oligopolistically competitive model of legal casinos under laissez-faire 
or entry or tax regulation regimes in which a number of external effects from casino-style gambling 
are explicitly taken into account.  In the benchmark case, we assume the ratio of local to total 
gamblers to be exogenous; we later generalize the analysis by allowing the ratio to be determined in 
equilibrium by considering locationally-differentiated consumers.  In this general setup, the 
configuration of casinos may be centralized or dispersed.  We compare equilibrium and command 
optimum outcomes under various regimes and different casino configurations.  The welfare 
implications are also studied.   
Along these lines, one may think whether a certain policy mix, say, a combination of a tax 
surcharge with a license fee, may be a better program to achieve higher community welfare.  
Moreover, it may be interesting to extend the model to allow for product differentiation in casino   27
services.  Should gamblers have a strong preference for a certain variety of casino products, the 
local government could consider issuing more casino licenses in order to enhance community 
welfare.  Another concern is related to social norms.  Supposing that an individual’s decision 
regarding whether to gamble depends on others (or the social norm), a reinforcing effect may be 
present.  As a consequence, if the net external marginal benefit from casino-style gambling is 
negative, a stingy casino regulation may be required so as to minimize the negative reinforcing 
external  effect.     28
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